商品敘述：

In mid-1993, representatives of Rhone-Poulenc, a leading nationalized French firm, worked with the French government to plan the imminent privatization of the firm. One aspect of the privatization was to create incentives for employees to buy and hold shares in the firm. A partial privatization earlier in 1993 proved that workers were reluctant to hold equities, even after receiving discounts and subsidized financing. The key financial officers of the firm received a proposal from Bankers Trust that would offer employees a unique investment in the firm, which might increase employee participation in the share offering. This alternative would guarantee employees a minimum rate of return yet allow them to enjoy appreciation of the firm''s shares. The financial officers have to decide whether to propose this employee stock ownership alternative to the French government and to Rhone-Poulenc''s board for inclusion in the forthcoming privatization.

涵蓋領域：

Return on investment;Capital markets;Derivatives;Valuation;Privatization;Risk management;Employee stock ownership plans

相關資料：

Case Teaching Note, (5-298-042), 22p, by Peter Tufano;
Spreadsheet Supplement, (XLS753), 0p, by Donald S. Collat, Peter Tufano

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